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SUMMARY
Two years ago, the Alberta government put in place a temporary oil-production 
quota. However, the quota’s impact could well be felt in the province’s oil 
production for years to come. The quota applied only to firms producing 
more than 10,000 barrels of oil per day and was instituted as a response to 
pipeline constraints that caused Alberta oil prices to be much lower than prices 
elsewhere. Production from both oilsands mines and oil wells dropped as soon 
as the government announced the quotas. The media warned that the quotas 
would force production to transfer to Saskatchewan, but the research for this 
paper found that this never occurred.
The quota policy was announced in December 2018 and a week later, the price 
of Alberta oil had jumped from $29.09/bbl to $50.08 bbl, a 72 per cent rise. 
When the quota policy actually took effect the first of January 2019, the price 
increased again, but by much less. The anticipation of the quota alone was 
enough to create the desired price increase.
The quota, which set limits for the total combined crude oil and bitumen 
permitted to be produced, was assigned to individual operators and designed 
to provide an 8.5 per cent reduction in oil production. The total quota was fixed 
at 3.56 million barrels a day in January 2019, but individual quotas could be 
traded across eligible operators, minimizing the overall costs of achieving the 
total goal. However, total production continued falling even when the quota was 
eventually relaxed; the market and a low world price created a scenario in which 
production fell below the amount permitted by the quota. All the oil companies 
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reduced their production regardless of whether they fell within the quota’s guidelines or 
not; however, the firms that were subject to the quota reduced their production more 
than the others. The quota was lifted in December 2020 when export capacity again 
became sufficient.
While curtailing production had the desired result of raising Alberta oil prices and 
resolving the differential between local prices and the world benchmark, its ripple effects 
may well be felt in the longer term. This paper finds that fewer wells are being drilled 
and more wells are suspending production. Tradition dictates that when a well becomes 
inactive, it is rarely returned to a productive state. Those firms that resorted to low levels 
of drilling in order to meet the quota have created a situation that could affect Alberta 
oil production in the years ahead.
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In 2019, the Alberta government implemented a curtailment order that put a hard 
cap on provincial oil production. The order was in response to pipeline constraints 
causing the price of oil in Alberta to be much lower than prices elsewhere. Alberta 
prices responded immediately following the announcement of the quota, even 
before the quota itself was implemented. Once implemented, the quota slowed 
down production. Schaufele and Winter (2021) estimate that the increase in 
oil prices resulted in a transfer of over $600 million per month from refiners to 
oil producers. In this communiqué we examine the ways in which oil producers 
adjusted to the quota. We find a reduction in production from both oilsands mines 
and oil wells. Production reduction from oil wells came from fewer wells being 
drilled and more wells stopping production. While media reports warned that 
production would shift to Saskatchewan (Nickel 2019; Williams 2019), we do not see 
this shift in the data.
SPECIFICS ABOUT ALBERTA’S PRODUCTION QUOTA 
Alberta’s curtailment order was announced on December 2, 2018, to be in effect 
from January 1, 2019; it stayed in place until December 2020. The curtailment order 
allowed for the establishment of a total quota each month limiting the amount of 
combined crude oil and bitumen that could be produced in the province. To make 
the quota enforceable, individual quotas were assigned to individual operators; that 
is, to the firms that control the output of an oil well or mine (Government of Alberta 
2018). The individual quotas were based on an operator’s “baseline production,” 
the maximum quantity produced in any given month in the year preceding the 
announcement. Operators with a baseline production below 10,000 barrels per day 
(bbl/day) were exempt from a quota (and starting in October 2019 the threshold 
for eligibility was raised to 20,000 bbl/day). The remaining operators were allowed 
to produce a certain percentage of their baseline production above the threshold 
of 10,000 bbl/day, and any of this allocation that was not used could not be carried 
over to the next month. The percentage was calculated each month so that the total 
production in the province did not exceed the total quota established for that month. 
The quota was designed to initially provide roughly an 8.5 per cent reduction in 
Alberta’s oil production (in January 2019, the quota was set at 3.56 million bbl/day 
and forecasted production absent the quota was 3.89 million bbl/day). In a clever 
policy design, quotas could be traded across eligible operators, a policy choice that 
minimized the overall costs of achieving the total quota. That is, in allowing trading, 
the firms’ own incentives worked towards production being cut from the lowest 
cost options (e.g., a high-cost firm would have an incentive to pay a low-cost firm to 
take on more quota). 
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OIL PRODUCTION AND QUOTA 
As seen in Figure 1, the total provincial quota was gradually increased throughout 
2019. Total daily production never perfectly matched the quota, implying that in 
any given month, some operators did not use their full allocation. While the transfer 
of quotas between operators was permitted, transaction costs may have been too 
high to allow for such transfers to be fully used. The non-binding quota could also 
indicate the fuzzy ability of firms to hit a production target, or the existence of 
hidden costs to reduce production, that resulted in firms overshooting the quota. 
We do not know what the counterfactual production would be in the absence of 
the quota, and it could be that firms would not have continued to produce at 2018 
levels. Regardless, we can see that up until August 2019, total production followed a 
similar trajectory with the provincial quota, suggesting the quota did have an effect 
on controlling the growth of total oil production. However, beginning in September 
2019, total production dropped, despite a continued relaxation of the quota. Market 
conditions and a low world price caused operators to lower production even more 
below the amount permitted under the quota. While outside the time period of 
our study, the December 2020 end to the quota was attributed to the quota being 
unnecessary given sufficient export capacity. 
Figure 1: Alberta 2019 Oil Production and Quota (Averaged to the Day)
Sources: Author’s calculations for daily production from GeoLOGIC Systems (2020) and Alberta Energy 
Regulator (2020). Author’s calculations for daily quota from Government of Alberta (2020).
Note: Aggregated monthly production data are divided by the number of days in each month.
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OIL PRICES
Using daily oil-price data retrieved from Natural Resources Canada, we see the oil 
price increased more following the announcement of the quota (in December 2018) 
than following its implementation (in January 2019). Figure 2 plots the two prices 
most often compared when evaluating the strength of the Alberta oil market: a 
global benchmark, West Texas Intermediate (WTI), which is a light, sweet crude oil, 
with an Alberta benchmark, Western Canada Select (WCS), a heavy, sour blend of 
crude oil. Although WTI and WCS do not represent the same grade of oil, WTI is 
commonly used as a benchmark to compare to the WCS because they are strongly 
correlated (monthly data from January 2005 to February 2020 yield a correlation 
coefficient of 0.94). The typical difference between the two prices hovered around 
C$13.22/bbl, until 2013 when, coupled with apportionment of pipeline space on the 
Trans Mountain Pipeline and Enbridge Mainline, the difference began to increase 
(Fellows 2018). The difference reached a record high of $65.03/bbl on October 11, 
2018, which was most likely due to pipeline constraints (Fellows 2018). 
The quota policy was announced December 2, 2018 (indicated by the first vertical 
line in Figure 2) and came into effect on January 1, 2019 (indicated by the second 
vertical line). The announcement alone was followed by a large increase in the 
Alberta oil price, jumping from $29.09/bbl before the announcement to $50.08/
bbl a week later, an increase of 72 per cent. When the production curtailment 
finally came into effect, the Alberta price increased by a much smaller amount. 
The anticipation of the quota had already restored the differential to be within its 
typical range. Even though the quota was never binding, the drop in production 
was enough to see a large increase in the Alberta price. In a world with pipeline 
constraints, a small reduction in production can result in a large increase in local 
prices, if the drop is large enough to alleviate the pipeline constraint (McRae 2017). 
For example, consider that the local price is determined by the cost to transport the 
marginal barrel (i.e., the cost to supply the most expensive barrel in the market); if 
the marginal barrel is shipped by rail, we will have a lower price than if the marginal 
barrel is shipped by pipe. A discontinuous jump in price can arise when production 
shifts from a world with pipeline constraints to a world without. 
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Figure 2: Daily Oil Prices, June 2018 to February 2020
Sources: Author’s calculations from Natural Resources Canada (2020).
FIRM BEHAVIOUR IN RESPONSE TO QUOTA
Alberta produced less oil following the quota. Figure 3 (a) depicts monthly oil 
production by companies that were subject to the quota and those that were 
not. While both types of companies reduced production, the companies subject 
to the quota reduced more, and the reduction persisted. Focusing only on the 
production of quota-eligible companies, in Figure 3 (b), the reduction appears to 
have come from both oilsands mining and oil wells (which include conventional and 
unconventional, including oilsands in-situ wells). 
On what margin did firms reduce production? We see fewer wells being drilled 
(Figure 3, c) and more wells suspending production (Figure 3, d). Previous research 
has found that conventional and unconventional production responds to price 
changes through changes in the number of wells drilled, and not through changes 
in production from existing wells (Anderson et al. 2018; Newell et al. 2018). We find 
similarly that drilling is a responsive margin, but further document that inactivating 
wells is another margin through which firms respond. For the count of wells drilled 
in a month, we only want to include oil wells, so we exclude the wells that only ever 
produced gas or condensate. To count the number of wells that stopped producing, 
we count the number of wells that switched from producing oil in the month before 
to not producing in the next month (shut-ins). In January 2019, when the quota 
was implemented, we see the gap between quota-eligible firms and non-eligible 
shrink in terms of the number of wells drilled. Similarly, the quota-eligible firms 
saw a large jump in the number of wells that were producing the previous month 
but then stopped producing. Quota-eligible firms were perhaps scheduling an 
early shutdown of wells that were soon going to stop producing anyway, because 
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in the following months the number of wells switching to zero production is lower 
than the average monthly number in previous years. The drop in shut-ins in the 
last month of our data could be an artifact of the data not yet being updated, only 
reiterating the importance of having a control group to compare. Nonetheless, 
the jump in shut-ins in the month the quota was introduced poses a concern, 
considering that inactive wells are rarely reactivated (Muehlenbachs 2015). 
Newspaper reports discussed production moving to Saskatchewan as a result 
of the quota (Nickel 2019; Williams 2019). While we do not know what would 
have happened without the quota, Figure 3 (e) shows that during this time, 
Saskatchewan oil production also decreased. 
Figure 3
(a) Oil Production by Firms (b) Production by Type for Quota Firms
(c) Drilling by Firms (d) Shut-ins by Firms
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(e) Comparing Production with Saskatchewan
Sources: Author’s calculations from GeoLOGIC Systems (2020) and Alberta Energy Regulator (2020).
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This analysis shows that Alberta’s curtailment policy was successful in resolving the 
extreme price differential found between the local oil price and a world benchmark 
oil price. At least for the first few months, the policy appears to have restrained 
growth in oil production from companies subject to the quota. One way that firms 
responded when faced with a quota was to reduce drilling activity. While the quota 
was intended to be a temporary measure to alleviate a temporary problem, the 
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